The Soviet–Afghan War 1979–89
Gregory Fremont-Barnes 2014-06-06 The Soviet invasion of its neighbour Afghanistan in December 1979 sparked a bloody nine-year conflict in that country until Soviet forces withdrew in 1988-89, dooming the communist Afghanistan government to defeat at the hands of the Mujahideen, the Afghan popular resistance backed by the USA and other powers. The Soviet invasion had enormous implications on the global stage; it prompted the US Senate to refuse to ratify the hard-won SALT II arms-limitation treaty, and the USA and 64 other countries boycotted the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics. For Afghanistan, the invasion served to prolong the interminable civil war that pitted central government against the regions and faction against faction. The country remains locked in conflict over 30 years later, with no end in sight. Featuring specially drawn mapping and drawing upon a wide range of sources, this succinct account explains the origins, history and consequences of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, thereby shedding new light on the more recent history – and prospects – of that troubled country.

The Soviet-Afghan War 1979-89 - Russia (Federation). Generalʹnyĭ shtab 2002 A critical examination of the Soviet military's role in the 1979-1989 War in Afghanistan presents the Russian view of how the war occurred while chronicling its major battles and operations and offering insight into Soviet tactics and strategy. Simultaneous.

The Soviet-Afghan War - Anthony Tucker-Jones 2014-01-19 This photographic history of the Soviet-Afghan War of 1979 to 1989 gives a fascinating insight into a grim conflict that prefigured the American-led campaign in that country. In an unequal struggle, the mujahedeen resisted for ten years, then triumphed over Moscow. For the Soviet Union, the futile intervention has been compared to the similar humiliation suffered by the United States in Vietnam. For the Afghans the victory was just one episode in the long history of their efforts to free their territory from the interference of foreign powers. By focusing on the Soviet use of heavy weaponry, Anthony Tucker-Jones shows the imbalance at the heart of a conflict in which the mechanized, industrial might of a super power was set against lightly armed partisans who became experts in infiltration tactics and ambushes. His work is a visual record of the tactics and the equipment the Soviets used to counter the resistance and protect vulnerable convoys. It also shows what this grueling conflict was like for the Soviet soldiers, the guerrilla fighters and the Afghan population, and it puts the present war in Afghanistan in a thought-provoking historical perspective.

The Soviet-Afghan War - Gregory Fremont-Barnes 2012 The Soviet invasion of neighbouring Afghanistan in December 1979 sparked a bloody nine-year conflict with the Mujahideen until Soviet forces withdrew in 1988-89, dooming the communist Afghanistan government to defeat by
Afghan popular resistance backed by the USA and other powers. The Soviet invasion had enormous implications on the global stage; it prompted the US Senate to refuse to ratify the hard-won SALT II arms-limitation treaty, and the USA and 64 other countries boycotted the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics. For Afghanistan, the invasion served to prolong the interminable civil war that pitted central government against the regions and faction against faction. The country remains locked in conflict over 30 years later, with no end in sight. For over a year before the invasion the communist Afghan government, installed following a coup and intent on forcibly modernizing the country's civil law in the face of centuries of feudal practices, had called for Soviet armed assistance in its efforts to overcome the open rebellion of the Mujahideen. Fearing the international consequences should the Afghan government be toppled, the Soviets decided to invade. From the outset, though, they failed to understand that communist principles were incompatible with traditional tribal relationships - especially in a country notorious for its poor communications and resistance to centralization. The Soviets found that their forces, largely made up of conscripts untrained in mountain warfare and counter-insurgency - and deploying 'conventional' weapons such as tanks and helicopters - could not defeat guerrillas enjoying the support of both the local population and powerful foreign allies such as the USA, and operating in harsh mountainous and/or desert terrain that favoured the defenders. The Soviets decided to stage a phased withdrawal of their own forces and concentrated on building up the Afghan government forces, but the Mujahideen soon prevailed, ushering in a new era dominated by the Taliban, an Islamist militia group that controlled large parts of the country from the mid-1990s. Featuring specially drawn mapping and drawing upon a wide range of sources, this succinct account explains the origins, history and consequences of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, thereby shedding new light on the more recent history - and prospects - of that troubled country. From the Trade Paperback edition.

The Bleeding Wound-Yaacov Ro'i 2022-03-15
By the mid-1980s, public opinion in the USSR had begun to turn against Soviet involvement in Afghanistan: the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989) had become a long, painful, and unwinnable conflict, one that Mikhail Gorbachev referred to as a "bleeding wound" in a 1986 speech. The eventual decision to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan created a devastating ripple effect within Soviet society that, this book argues, became a major factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this comprehensive survey of the effects of the war on Soviet society and politics, Yaacov Ro'i analyzes the opinions of Soviet citizens on a host of issues connected with the war and documents the systemic change that would occur when Soviet leadership took public opinion into account. The war and the difficulties that the returning veterans faced undermined the self-esteem and prestige of the Soviet armed forces and provided ample ammunition for media correspondents who sought to challenge the norms of the Soviet system. Through extensive analysis of Soviet newspapers and interviews conducted with Soviet war veterans and regular citizens in the early 1990s, Ro'i argues that the effects of the war precipitated processes that would reveal the inbuilt limitations of the Soviet body politic and contribute to the dissolution of the USSR by 1991.

The Great Gamble-Gregory Feifer 2009-01-06
The Soviet war in Afghanistan was a grueling debacle that has striking lessons for the twenty-first century. In The Great Gamble, Gregory Feifer examines the conflict from the perspective of the soldiers on the ground. During the last years of the Cold War, the Soviet Union sent some of its most elite troops to unfamiliar lands in Central Asia to fight a vaguely defined enemy, which eventually defeated their superior numbers with unconventional tactics. Although the Soviet leadership initially saw the invasion as a victory, many Russian soldiers came to view the war as a demoralizing and devastating defeat, the consequences of which had a substantial impact on the Soviet Union and its collapse. Feifer's extensive research includes eye-opening interviews with participants from both sides of the conflict. In gripping detail, he vividly depicts the invasion of a volatile country that no power has ever successfully conquered. Parallels between the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq are impossible to ignore—both conflicts were waged amid vague ideological rhetoric about freedom. Both were roundly condemned by the outside world for trying to impose their favored forms of government on countries with very different ways of life. And both seem destined to end on uncertain terms. A groundbreaking account seen
through the eyes of the men who fought it, The Great Gamble tells an unforgettable story full of drama, action, and political intrigue whose relevance in our own time is greater than ever.

**What We Won**-Bruce Riedel 2014-07-28 In February 1989, the CIA's chief in Islamabad famously cabled headquarters a simple message: "We Won." It was an understated coda to the most successful covert intelligence operation in American history. In What We Won, CIA and National Security Council veteran Bruce Riedel tells the story of America's secret war in Afghanistan and the defeat of the Soviet 40th Red Army in the war that proved to be the final battle of the cold war. He seeks to answer one simple question—why did this intelligence operation succeed so brilliantly? Riedel has the vantage point few others can offer: He was ensconced in the CIA's Operations Center when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on Christmas Eve 1979. The invasion took the intelligence community by surprise. But the response, initiated by Jimmy Carter and accelerated by Ronald Reagan, was a masterful intelligence enterprise. Many books have been written about intelligence failures—from Pearl Harbor to 9/11. Much less has been written about how and why intelligence operations succeed. The answer is complex. It involves both the weaknesses and mistakes of America's enemies, as well as good judgment and strengths of the United States. Riedel introduces and explores the complex personalities pitted in the war—the Afghan communists, the Russians, the Afghan mujahideen, the Saudis, and the Pakistanis. And then there are the Americans—in this war, no Americans fought on the battlefield. The CIA did not send officers into Afghanistan to fight or even to train. In 1989, victory for the American side of the cold war seemed complete. Now we can see that a new era was also beginning in the Afghan war in the 1980s, the era of the global jihad. This book examines the lessons we can learn from this intelligence operation for the future and makes some observations on what came next in Afghanistan—and what is likely yet to come.


**Afghanistan**-Mohammed Kakar 1997-03-03 "The times Kakar writes about have... pervasively influenced every life in Afghanistan... He was continuously faced with different versions of the Afghan experience as his country went through one of the great cataclysms of its history. We are fortunate to have his account."—Robert Canfield, editor of Turko-Persia in Historical Perspective "This is the first history of recent events in Afghanistan by a native historian trained in London. Kakar writes objectively about the Soviets, the Afghan government, and the Mujahideen. With personal observations, including years spent in Kabul's notorious Pul-i Charkhi prison, this book is unique in revealing many events hitherto not known or recorded. It will remain a standard work on... contemporary Afghanistan."—Richard N. Frye, Harvard University "Kakar, one of Afghanistan's most distinguished scholars, has provided an outstanding account of a complex and interesting phase of modern Afghanistan history... A fascinating and absorbing analysis... exhaustive and most valuable."—Vartan Gregorian, President, Brown University

**Storm-333**-Mark Galeotti 2021-03-18 Storm-333, the operation to seize Kabul and assassinate Afghan leader Hafizullah Amin, was at once a textbook success and the start of a terrible blunder. It heralded the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, an operation intended to be a short, largely symbolic show of force, yet which quickly devolved into a grizzly ten-year counter-insurgency that Moscow was never able to win. Nonetheless, Storm-333 was a striking success, and despite initial concerns that it would be an impossible achievement, it saw a relative handful of Soviet special forces drawn from the KGB and the military seize the heavily defended presidential palace, neutralise the city's communications and defences, and open Kabul to occupation. The lessons learned then are still valid today, and have been incorporated into modern Russian military practice, visible most recently in the seizure of Crimea in 2014. Written by a recognised expert on the Soviet security forces, drawing extensively on Russian sources, and fully illustrated with commissioned artwork, this is the most detailed and compelling study of this fascinating operation available in English.

**Predicting the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan**-Douglas J. MacEachin 2002
**Ghost Wars** - Steve Coll

2005-03-03

The news-breaking book that has sent shockwaves through the White House, Ghost Wars is the most accurate and revealing account yet of the CIA’s secret involvement in al-Qaeda’s evolution. Prize-winning journalist Steve Coll has spent years reporting from the Middle East, accessed previously classified government files and interviewed senior US officials and foreign spymasters. Here he gives the full inside story of the CIA’s covert funding of an Islamic jihad against Soviet forces in Afghanistan, explores how this sowed the seeds of bin Laden’s rise, traces how he built his global network and brings to life the dramatic battles within the US government over national security. Above all, he lays bare American intelligence’s continual failure to grasp the rising threat of terrorism in the years leading to 9/11 - and its devastating consequences.

**The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan** - Amin Saikal

1989-04-06

Nearly ten years of bloodshed and political turmoil have followed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Soviet occupation not only proved a major trauma for the people of Afghanistan; invasion ended the growth in superpower dentents that had characterised the late 1970s; and in the Soviet Union the effects of escalating military costs and over 13,000 young military casualties have been felt at every level of society. The decision to withdraw combat forces under the provisions of the Geneva Accords of April 1988 is one of the most dramatic developments in the international system since the end of the Second World War. The effects of this decision will be felt not only in Afghanistan, but in the Soviet Union, in Southwest Asia, and in the wider world. The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan has been designed to explore the background to the decision to withdraw and its broader implications. The authors, all established specialists, examine the Geneva Accords; the future for post-withdrawal Afghanistan; and the impact of withdrawal on regional states, Soviet foreign and domestic policies, the Soviet armed forces, Sino-Soviet relations and world politics. They write from diverse disciplinary traditions, while bringing together a shared sensitivity to the issues which complicate the Afghan question.

**The Bleeding Wound** - Yaacov Ro'i

2022

“This book considers the significance of the the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989) to Soviet politics, society, and the military in the twilight of the USSR, and its indirect influence on the evolution of its successor states. Yaacov Ro'i argues that the war had significant effects beyond its direct impact on the large number of Soviet citizens who served in Afghanistan during its course, either as soldiers (afghantsy) sent into Afghanistan to uphold the PDPA Marxist regime that had taken power in Kabul in April 1978, or as advisers and civilian specialists dispatched to Afghanistan to build up and modernize the country on the Soviet model and bring it closer to the Soviet Union. Even if officially the Soviets did not lose the war, the very fact that they were unable to decisively defeat the mujahidin comprised a blow to the self-esteem of the Soviet armed forces and undermined their prestige at home. In this comprehensive examination of the effects of the war on Soviet society and politics, Ro'i considers the portrayal of the war in Soviet media, and the struggles that afghantsy veterans faced as they readapted to civilian life. The war and the way it came to be understood by Soviet citizens also served to highlight the weaknesses of the Soviet regime during glasnost’. Through a detailed account of public opinion surrounding the war and its impact on Soviet politics and society in the Gorbachev era, including extensive interviews that the author conducted with Soviet war veterans in the early 1990s, Ro'i argues that the effects of the war certainly precipitated processes that would tear the country asunder in 1991”–

**Soviet-Afghan War (December 1979 to September 1989): Success Leads to Failure**

2008

Successfully invading and seizing control of Afghanistan in 1979 was the primary measurable success of the Soviet Union; it was the long term policy that failed to adequately recognize and adapt to a society who perceived a threat to their culture.

**The Patriotism of Despair** - Serguei Alex. Oushakine

2011-02-23

The sudden dissolution of the Soviet Union altered the routines, norms, celebrations, and shared understandings that had shaped the lives of Russians for generations. It also meant an end to the state-sponsored, nonmonetary support that most residents had lived with all their lives. How did Russians make
sense of these historic transformations? Serguei Alex Oushakine offers a compelling look at postsocialist life in Russia. In Barnaul, a major industrial city in southwestern Siberia that has lost 25 percent of its population since 1991, many Russians are finding that what binds them together is loss and despair. The Patriotism of Despair examines the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, graphically described in spray paint by a graffiti artist in Barnaul: "We have no Motherland." Once socialism disappeared as a way of understanding the world, what replaced it in people's minds? Once socialism stopped orienting politics and economics, how did capitalism insinuate itself into routine practices? Serguei Alex. Oushakine offers a compelling look at postsocialist life in noncosmopolitan Russia. He introduces readers to the "neocom": people who mourn the loss of the Soviet economy and the remonetization of transactions that had not involved the exchange of cash during the Soviet era. Moving from economics into military conflict and personal loss, Oushakine also describes the ways in which veterans of the Chechen war and mothers of soldiers who died there have connected their immediate experiences with the country's historical disruptions. The country, the nation, and traumatized individuals, Oushakine finds, are united by their vocabulary of shared pain.

The Invasion of Afghanistan and UK-Soviet Relations, 1979-1982-Richard Smith
2012-03-15 This volume examines British policy towards the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. The documents in this volume, many released into the public realm for the first time, describe the development of British policy towards the Soviet Union during the eventful years 1979-1982. The new Conservative government, under Margaret Thatcher, was determined to strengthen British defences against the perceived Soviet threat and advocated a strong response to the Soviet intervention. East-West relations further deteriorated following the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981. The dilemma facing the British government was how to express strong disapproval of Soviet actions while still attempting to maintain a constructive bilateral relationship, and at the same time keep British policy in line with the Western Alliance. The death of President Brezhnev in November 1982, after 18 years in office, brought uncertainty but also new opportunities for relations with the Soviets. This book will be of much interest to students of British politics and foreign policy, Russian history, US foreign policy, Central Asian politics, and IR in general.


Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society-Julie Fedor 2016-01-05 This double special issue investigates the experiences of Soviet Afghan veterans and the ongoing impact of the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-89); and the new and reconstituted narratives of martyrdom that have been emerging in connection with 20th-century history and memory in the post-socialist world. The JOURNAL OF SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET POLITICS AND SOCIETY (JSPPS) is a new bi-annual companion journal to the Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society (SPPS) book series (founded 2004 and edited by Andreas Umland, Dr. phil., PhD). Guest editors: Felix Ackermann (European Humanities University); Michael Galbas (Konstanz University); Uilleam Blacker (UCL)

The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War-Ali Ahmad Jalali 2020-12-08 "The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War" by Ali Ahmad Jalali. Published by Good Press. Good Press publishes a wide range of titles that encompasses every genre. From well-known classics & literary fiction and non-fiction to forgotten—yet undiscovered gems—of world literature, we issue the books that need to be read. Each Good Press edition has been meticulously edited and formatted to boost readability for all e-readers and devices. Our goal is to produce eBooks that are user-friendly and accessible to everyone in a high-quality digital format.


The Fragmentation of Afghanistan-Barnett R. Rubin 2002-01-01 This monumental book examines Afghan society in conflict, from the 1978 communist coup to the fall of Najibullah,
Afghanistan in 1979, few experts believed that the fledgling Mujahideen resistance movement had a chance of withstanding the Soviet Army. In 1989, realizing they were trapped in an unwinnable war where they were suffering "death from a thousand cuts" by an intractable enemy who had no hope of winning, but fought on because it was the right thing to do, the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan. Few studies of guerrilla warfare from the guerrilla's perspective exist. To capture this perspective and the tactical experience of the Mujahideen, the United States Marine Corps commissioned this study and sent two retired combat veterans to interview Mujahideen. From those interviews has come this work, which tells the guerrillas' story as interpreted by military professionals. This is a book about death and survival, adaptation and perseverance. It provides an understanding of guerrilla field craft, tactics, techniques and procedures.

The Great Gamble-Gregory Feifer 2010-01-05
The Soviet war in Afghanistan was a grueling debacle that has striking lessons for the twenty-first century. In The Great Gamble, Gregory Feifer examines the conflict from the perspective of the soldiers on the ground. In gripping detail, he vividly depicts the invasion of a volatile country that no power has ever successfully conquered. A riveting account as seen through the eyes of the men who fought in the war, The Great Gamble tells an unforgettable story full of drama, action, and political intrigue whose relevance in our own time is greater than ever.

Soviet and Mujahideen Uniforms, Clothing, and Equipment in the Soviet-Afghan War, 1979-1989-Zammis Schein 2016-06-28 This book is the first detailed, illustrated guide to the military uniforms, civilian clothing, and equipment worn and used by Soviet soldiers and Mujahideen warriors in Afghanistan from December 1979 to February 1989. With over 500 images, this book presents front-line soldiers, NCOs, and officers in the main combat branches of the Soviet armed forces as well as Mujahideen warriors, actually ordinary Afghans, who were thrust by fate into the midst of a relentless guerrilla war against one of the largest regular armies in the world. Uniforms presented in this book are assembled in configurations confirmed by wartime photos. All photographs taken for this book are genuine service-issue or private-

The Other Side of the Mountain-Ali Ahmad Jalali 1999 When the Soviet Union invaded
purchase Soviet and Afghan Mujahideen items.

The Soviet-Afghan War—U. S. Military
2017-10-29 Nearly eight years since initiating combat operations in Afghanistan, the United States and our allies are witnessing first-hand the difficulty of denying sanctuary to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Similar to the Mujahideen in the Soviet-Afghan War, today's insurgents are leveraging mountainous terrain and international borders to survive against a superpower's counterinsurgency efforts. As the United States prepares to shift focus from Iraq to Afghanistan, it behooves us to incorporate lessons learned from the Soviet-Afghan War in order to adequately shape our force and equipment, evolve counterinsurgency tactics and doctrine, and integrate the elements of national power to deny insurgent sanctuary. I chose to study the Soviet efforts to deny the Mujahideen sanctuary because I believe sanctuary denial is a critical requirement for our success in the current fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The Soviet Union did not anticipate a decade-long counterinsurgency fight against the Mujahideen when it invaded the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) in December 1979. Determined to stabilize the rapidly deteriorating political-military situation in its newest client state, the Soviet Union conducted a coup de main modeled after successful interventions in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). The Soviet leadership believed that "...the mere presence of Soviet forces would serve to 'sober up' the Mujahideen..." and enable the DRA's communist government to suppress the insurgency. Failing to appreciate the will of the Mujahideen to resist foreign invaders, the Soviets miscalculated the nature of the war into which they entered. Instead of simply providing security, logistics, and combat support for DRA forces fighting the Mujahideen, the conventionally structured, trained, and equipped 40th Army assumed the lead against a determined guerrilla opponent in some of the most rugged terrain on earth. The Soviets properly identified sanctuary as a critical requirement for the Mujahideen to wage a successful resistance, but never effectively deprived the insurgency of this requirement. The Soviet Union failed to deny sanctuary to the Mujahideen because it deployed an inadequate force to Afghanistan, but more importantly, it proved unable to counteract international support for the insurgency.

INTRODUCTION * SANCTUARY DEFINED * GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT * DEMOGRAPHICS AND CULTURE * BACKGROUND * POLITICAL TURMOIL IN THE 1970s * SOVIET COMBAT OPERATIONS * INADEQUATE FORCE TO DENY SANCTUARY * COUNTERING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE MUJAHIDEEN * CONCLUSIONS * NOTES * APPENDIX A - AFGHANISTAN'S NEIGHBORS * APPENDIX B - AFGHANISTAN 3-D RELIEF MAP * APPENDIX C - MAIN ETHNIC GROUPS OF AFGHANISTAN * BIBLIOGRAPHY

Out of Afghanistan—Diego Cordovez 1995
Reveals how skillful diplomacy got the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan

The Other Side of the Mountain—Ali Ahmad Jalali 2010 Originally printed in very limited numbers in 1995, this book is a companion piece to "The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan." This unabridged quality reprint will provide tremendous insight for historians, journalists and anyone deployed in Afghanistan. Contains accounts of numerous actions fought by the Afghan resistance. Each account is told by the Afghan commander who participated in the action described. These commanders in the vast majority, were civilians who took up arms against the Soviets and developed the skills necessary to command guerrilla units. Most of these accounts are supported by a full page map, that show the topography, the locations of the attackers and defenders, movements, fields of fire etc. In addition is an invaluable guide to anyone wishing to understand modern guerrilla warfare, whether conducting one or fighting against guerrillas in the field. In addition this study provides invaluable insights in how to train and support guerrillas in the field. Each operation is commented on to highlight the elements that caused the operation/action to succeed or fail. In the event of failure what should have been done to have prevented such failure, or in the case of success what could have been done to have improved on that success.

Hip-Hop (And Other Things)—Shea Serrano
2021-10-26 HIP-HOP (AND OTHER THINGS) is the third book in the (And Other Things) series. The first two—Basketball (And Other Things) and Movies (And Other Things)—were both #1 New
No Retreat-Naval Postgraduate School
2014-10-17 In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to settle a quarrel among competing factions within the recently installed communist government, and to suppress the anti-communist resistance that the Afghan government’s ideology and conduct had inspired among the population. This dissertation examines the Soviet decision-making surrounding what proved to be a decade-long military effort. It focuses on the way political decision-making at the highest levels of the Soviet state shaped the war’s origins, conduct and outcome, with particular attention on the politics and inner workings of the Politburo, the most senior collective decision-making body in the government. Like most wars, the outcome of the Soviet-Afghan War appears over determined in retrospect. There is no claim here that the Soviet defeat can be attributed to their having missed some readily apparent path to victory, nor a claim that the Afghan war would have been won but for mistakes made in Moscow. Yet it remains true that the senior leadership of the Soviet Union quickly became aware that their strategy was unraveling, that their operational and tactical methods were not working, and that the sacrifices they were demanding from the Soviet people and military were unlikely to produce the results they hoped for. They persisted nonetheless. This book explains why and how that happened, as viewed from the center of the Soviet state. From that perspective, three sources of failure stand out: poor civil-military relations; repeated and often rapid turnover at the very summit of Soviet leadership; and the perception among Politburo members that Soviet global prestige and influence were inexorably tied to the success of the Afghan mission, which caused them to persist in their pursuit of a policy long after it was clearly unobtainable.

Afgantsy-Rodric Braithwaite 2013-09-11 The story of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is well known: the expansionist Communists overwhelmed a poor country as a means of reaching a warm-water port on the Persian Gulf. Afghan mujahideen upset their plans, holding on with little more than natural fighting skills, until CIA agents came to the rescue with American arms. Humiliated in battle, the Soviets hastily retreated. It’s a great story, writes Rodric Braithwaite. But it never happened. The Russian conscripts suffered badly from mismanagement and strategic errors, but they were never defeated on the battlefield, and withdrew in good order. In this brilliant, myth-busting account, Braithwaite - the former British ambassador to Moscow - challenges much of what we know about the Soviets in Afghanistan. He provides an inside look at this little-understood episode, using first-hand accounts and piercing analysis to show the war as it was fought and experienced by the Russians. The invasion, he writes, was a defensive response to a chaotic situation in the Soviets' immediate neighbor. They intended to establish a stable, friendly government, secure the major towns, and train the police and armed forces before making a rapid exit. But the mission escalated, as did casualties. In fact, the Soviet leadership decided to pull out a year before the first Stinger missile was used in combat. Braithwaite does not, of course, paint the occupation as a Russian triumph. To the contrary, he illustrates the searing effect of the brutal conflict on soldiers, their families, and the broader public, as returning veterans - the Afgansty of the title - struggled to regain their footing back home. A fine writer as well as an expert, Braithwaite carries readers through these complex and momentous events, capturing those violent and tragic days as no one has done before.

"We Have Not Learned how to Wage War There"-Matt Matthews 2011

The Cambridge History of the Cold War-Melvyn P. Leffler 2010-03-25 This volume examines the origins and early years of the Cold War in the first comprehensive historical reexamination of the period. A team of leading scholars shows how the conflict evolved from the geopolitical, ideological, economic and sociopolitical environments of the two world wars and interwar period.

The Afghanistan Wars-William Maley 2009-08-26 A whole generation has grown up in Afghanistan knowing little but the ravages of war. The dramatic overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001 was simply one event in a series of interrelated struggles which have blighted ordinary people’s lives over the last three decades, and which continue to interfere with
reconciliation and reconstruction. This new edition of The Afghanistan Wars provides a meticulously-documented history of these successive waves of conflict. It explores in detail:

• the roots of Afghanistan’s slide into disorder in the late 1970s
• how the Soviet Union came to the rescue of unworthy clients and was then sucked into a quagmire
• the frightening consequences of state breakdown and self-interested meddling by Afghanistan’s neighbours in the period after communist rule collapsed
• the rise and fall of the Taliban regime.

Thoroughly revised in the light of the latest research, the second edition also features a new final chapter which examines post-Taliban Afghanistan, bringing the story up to the present day and mounting a strong case for continuing support for this troubled country.

Soviet Paratrooper vs Mujahideen Fighter
David Campbell 2017-11-30

In 1979 the Soviet Union moved from military ‘help’ to active intervention in Afghanistan. Four-fifths of the Afghan National Army deserted in the first year of the war, which, compounded with the spread and intensification of the rebellion led by the formidable guerrilla fighters of the Mujahideen, forced the Soviets to intensify their involvement. The Soviet army was in generally poor condition when the war started, but the troops of the airborne and air assault units were better trained and equipped. As a result they developed aggressive, sometimes effective tactics against an enemy that refused to behave the way most Soviet commanders wished him to. Featuring specially commissioned artwork, this absorbing study examines the origins, combat role and battlefield performance of the Soviet Union’s paratroopers and their Mujahideen adversaries during the long and bloody Soviet involvement in Afghanistan during the 1980s.

Killing the Cranes
Edward Girardet 2012-08-08

Few reporters have covered Afghanistan as intrepidly and humanely as Edward Girardet. Now, in a gripping, personal account, Girardet delivers a story of that nation’s resistance fighters, foreign invaders, mercenaries, spies, aid workers, Islamic extremists, and others who have defined Afghanistan’s last thirty years of war, chaos, and strife. As a young foreign correspondent, Girardet arrived in Afghanistan just three months prior to the Soviet invasion in 1979. Over the next decades, he trekked hundreds of miles across rugged mountains and deserts on clandestine journeys following Afghan guerrillas in battle as they smuggled French doctors into the country, and as they combated each other as well as invaders. He witnessed the world’s greatest refugee exodus, the bitter Battle for Kabul in the early 1990s, the rise of the Taliban, and, finally, the US-led Western military and recovery effort that began in 2001.

Girardet’s encounters with key figures—including Ahmed Shah Massoud, the famed "Lion of Panjshir” assassinated by al Qaeda two days before 9/11, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, an Islamic extremist massively supported by the Americans during the 1980s only to become one of today’s most ruthless anti-Western insurgents, and Osama bin Laden—shed extraordinary light on the personalities who have shaped the nation, and its current challenges, from corruption and narcotics trafficking to selfish regional interests. Killing the Cranes provides crucial insights into why the West’s current involvement has turned into such a disaster, not only rekindling a new insurgency, but squandering billions of dollars on a recovery process that has shown scant success.

The Hidden War
Artem Borovik 1990

A Soviet journalist documents the experiences of Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan, detailing the soldiers' morale, the prevalence of drug problems, and the Russian withdrawal and the aftermath.

Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
C. J. Dick 2002

Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society
Julie Fedor 2015-10-01

This double special issue investigates the experiences of Soviet Afghan veterans and the ongoing impact of the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-89); and the new and reconstituted narratives of martyrdom that have been emerging in connection with 20th-century history and memory in the post-socialist world. The JOURNAL OF SOVIET AND POST-SOViet POLITICS AND SOCIETY (JSPPS) is a new bi-annual companion journal to the Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society (SPPS) book series (founded 2004 and edited by Andreas Umland, Dr. phil., PhD). Guest editors: Felix Ackermann (European Humanities University); Michael Galbas (Konstanz University); Uilleam Blacker (UCL)